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An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers
Jack M. Beermann *
Abstract:
Separation of powers is one of least understood doctrines in U.S. law and
politics. Underlying a great deal of separation of powers analysis is the
conventional view that the United States Constitution requires a strict separation
between the three branches of government and that efforts within one branch to
influence or control the exercise of another branch’s powers are illegitimate and
should be rejected whenever possible. Although its simplicity might be
appealing, this image of strict separation is inconsistent with both the Framers’
understanding of separation of powers and with the law as developed by the
Supreme Court in the face of the explosive growth of the regulatory state over
more than a century. This article articulates an inductive understanding of
separation of powers as practiced under the United States Constitution, arrived
at by examining case law and actual practice, not deduced from general
principles or an ideal conception of separation of powers. Although the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), striking down, on
separation of powers grounds, the statutory provision regulating removal of
Board members adverted to the Vesting Clause of Article II, the Vesting
Clauses of the Constitution’s first three articles have not been particularly
important to the resolution of actual disputes over the separation of powers.
The Court does not decide separation of powers controversies by determining
the nature of a power and then assigning it to the appropriate branch as specified
in the Vesting Clauses. Using examples from across the spectrum of separation
of powers controversies, this article establishes that the basic principle of
separation of powers under the United States Constitution involves strict
enforcement of the Constitution’s structural and procedural requirements for
action by each branch and great flexibility and deference to Congress when
ruling on whether a more general principle of separation of powers has been
transgressed.
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An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers
Jack M. Beermann *
I. Introduction.
Separation of powers is one of least understood doctrines in U.S. law and
politics. Underlying a great deal of separation of powers analysis is the
conventional view that the United States Constitution requires a strict separation
between the three branches of government and that efforts within one branch to
influence or control the exercise of another branch’s powers are illegitimate and
should be rejected whenever possible. Although its simplicity might be
appealing, this image of strict separation is inconsistent with the Framers’
understanding of separation of powers 1 and with the law as developed by the
Supreme Court in the face of the explosive growth of the regulatory state over
more than a century. Every so often, a decision or series of decisions by the
Supreme Court raises the specter of movement toward a strict view of
separation of powers, but ultimately any such movement sputters to a halt, and
in retrospect it usually turns out that the appearance of movement was more in
the nature of wishful thinking than actual change. In fact, the Supreme Court
has been remarkably consistent in rejecting judicial enforcement of strict
separation of powers.
The Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, 2 (PCAOB), striking down one feature of the
structure of the Board on separation of powers grounds, may be another such
decision. The opening paragraph of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the
*
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1
This article is about the current understanding and application of separation of powers norms
and not about any originalist separation of powers doctrine. It is worth noting, however, that it
does not appear that the Framers intended to adopt a strict version of separation of powers. In
Federalist 48, James Madison described the general theory of separation of powers as follows:
It was shewn in the last paper, that the political apothegm there examined, does not
require that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments should be wholly
unconnected with each other. I shall undertake in the next place, to shew that unless these
departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional controul
over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free
government, can never in practice, be duly maintained.
2
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010). The Court upheld the process for appointing members of the
Board but struck down the provision prohibiting the Securities and Exchange Commissioners
from terminating members of the Board without cause. This is discussed in more detail below
at xxx.
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Court contains the strongest indication in recent years that the Supreme Court
might embrace a strict view of separation of powers. The paragraph invoked
three key elements of a pro-executive power version of strict separation of
powers that has become known as the unitary executive theory: government
power is divided into “three defined categories;” 3 the executive power is vested
in the President; and Executive Branch officials, even in independent agencies,
are constitutionally understood as assisting the President in discharging his
duties. Taken to its extreme, as the unitary executive theory does, the logical
end of these three propositions would be to pronounce unconstitutional the
independence of independent agencies and all efforts to insulate the execution
of the law from complete presidential control. 4
While previous Supreme Court opinions have adverted to the government’s
three branch structure in ways that point toward a strict separation of powers, 5
the PCAOB opinion is notable for invoking the Vesting Clause of Article II.
The Vesting Clauses of the Constitution’s first three articles provide a blueprint
for the structure of the government, but they have not been particularly
important to the resolution of actual disputes over the separation of powers. 6 To

3

The PCAOB Court’s reference to “three defined categories” of governmental power was not
new. In this particular case, the Court quoted a passage in the Chadha decision. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of
the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial,
to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its
assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to
exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.”)
quoted in PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3146.
4
For example, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L.
Rev. 1231, 1242 (1994) (“if a statute vests discretionary authority directly in an agency official
(as do most regulatory statutes) rather than in the President, the Article II Vesting Clause seems
to require that such discretionary authority be subject to the President's control”). But see
Kendall v. United States, 27 U.S (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) (Executive Branch officials are not
all under the exclusive control of the President); Kevin Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers
to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263 (2006) (delegation directly to agency indicates
congressional intent not to have the President in charge of administering statute).
5
See, e.g., Chadha v. INS, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
6
The Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II are invoked more often in concurring and dissenting
opinions than in the Court’s majority opinions. The most prominent example of this may be
Justice Scalia’s invocation of Article II’s Vesting Clause in his dissenting opinion in Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698-99, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting), concerning the
constitutionality of the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. In
that opinion, after quoting Article II’s Vesting Clause for the second time, Justice Scalia
exclaimed “As I described at the outset of this opinion, this does not mean some of the executive
power, but all of the executive power.” The Vesting Clause of Article II is cited in majority
opinions as the source of the nondelegation doctrine which, as described below at xxx,
embodies a relatively lenient constraint on Congress’s ability to confer discretion on the
Executive Branch. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991); Mistretta v.
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the contrary, the Vesting Clauses lurk in the background while center stage is
occupied by the Constitution’s numerous structural and procedural provisions
that operate to create a governmental system best described as separation of
powers with checks and balances. The Court has never decided separation of
powers controversies by determining the nature of a power and then assigning it
to the appropriate branch as specified in the Vesting Clauses. Rather, by and
large, the Court has strictly enforced the structural and procedural requirements
for action by each branch while being very deferential to Congress when ruling
on whether a more general principle of separation of powers has been
transgressed. If in the future the Vesting Clauses are brought to the foreground,
we might see a new form of separation of powers analysis under which powers
are assigned to branches and little or no inter-branch interference is tolerated.
Fortunately (or unfortunately depending on your perspective) the Court in
PCAOB did not deliver on the opening paragraph of the opinion’s promise of a
major reform in the law of separation of powers. The Court did not read Article
II’s Vesting Clause as requiring that the PCAOB be brought under complete
presidential control or that PCAOB members be appointed by the President or
be removable without cause by the President. To the contrary, the Court
reaffirmed its longstanding general approach to separation of powers issues,
showing great flexibility with regard to the appointment of the PCAOB
members and tightening up only modestly with regard to their removal. 7
The purpose of this article is to provide a description of current separation of
powers doctrine as embodied in precedent and common understandings of the
practice of separation of powers in the government of the United States. 8 The
__________________________________________________________________
U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1988). The Vesting Clause of Article III is invoked often in the
Court’s majority opinions concerning the scope of the judicial power.
7
The PCAOB was created in 2002 as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s reform of regulation of
the accounting industry. See 116 Stat. 745, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211 et seq. The Board
consists of five members appointed and removable only for serious cause by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The PCAOB’s function is to enforce the aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and other laws and regulations that apply to the accounting industry. The PCAOB was
modeled on private self-regulatory agencies such as the New York Stock Exchange and
although the Act declares that the PCAOB members are not government officers or employees,
they clearly are for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Its members are very well paid for
government officials, with pay ranging from $547,000 to $673,000. See PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at
3147-48.
8
Because the goal of this article is to take a fresh look at the practice and practical understanding
of separation of powers in the givernment of the United States, I do not engage the voluminous
scholarship that exists on the subject. Although the picture painted here may strike some
readers as novel and somewhat unconventional, it shares some attributes with Elizabeth Magill,
Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603 (2001) and
Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
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idea is to provide a general understanding of separation of powers as it actually
structures the distribution of power within the federal government of the United
States of America. The article is inductive, deriving separation of powers
principles from the caselaw concerning how the government is structured, rather
than deductive, which would derive the proper structure from abstract
principles. I have chosen this methodology for two related reasons. First, in my
view, there is no set of abstract principles from which an appropriate
governmental structure consistent with separation of powers could be derived.
Second, even if it were possible to construct an appropriate governmental
structure from separation of powers principles, it would not take into account
the particulars of the Constitution of the United States and thus would be of
limited utility in understanding how separation of powers actually works under
that Constitution.
The PCAOB decision, as the Court’s latest pronouncement on separation of
powers fundamentals, is highlighted somewhat, although this article’s focus is
well beyond PCAOB. Although in my view current law creates a pretty good
governmental structure and is not patently inconsistent with a normatively
desirable understanding of the meaning of the Constitution, I do not mean to
state a normative theory of separation of powers understood either as an
efficiently functioning government or a correct understanding of the
Constitution’s requirements. Rather, the idea of this article is to describe and
analyze separation of powers as actually practiced by the government of the
United States under the constitutional constraints recognized by the Supreme
Court.
II. Separation of Powers Basics.
Separation of powers is one of the pillars of government in the United States.
The federal government and all state governments are structured around the
principle of separation of powers. 9 Yet, a general theory of separation of
powers has proven elusive. There is, of course, the basic principle of separation
of powers and the idea that each branch exercises its own powers and does not
intrude on the powers of the other branches, but this understanding is not
complete for several reasons. For one, it does not incorporate the principle of
__________________________________________________________________
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984). See also Arnold I Burns & Steven J. Markman,
Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 Pace L. Rev. 575 (1987).
9
State separation of powers law is similar but not identical to federal law. In one area of
significant difference, some state courts have recognized substantive separation of powers limits
on legislative reform in areas of traditional judicial control such as damages in personal injury
cases. See, e.g, Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, Inc., 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997) (statutory damages cap
on noneconomic injuries violates Illinois separation of powers doctrine).

5
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checks and balances which is designed to prevent or hinder branches of
government from acting unilaterally. Further, it does not account for the near
impossibility of matching activities to their proper branch. And it fails to
recognize that different branches often take actions that, while procedurally and
structurally distinct, function identically as a matter of substance.
Some basic propositions, elaborated upon in the course of the article, underlie
the view of separation of powers espoused here. They are:
1. The bulk of separation of powers analysis comprises the application of
the various specific procedural and structural provisions contained in the
Constitution and not an overarching theory of separation of powers.
2. Building on proposition 1, the courts generally enforce the procedural
and structural provisions of the Constitution strictly. When, however, a
separation of powers controversy cannot be resolved with reference to a
particular provision of the Constitution, the courts apply a very forgiving
standard and are unlikely to find a violation of the general principle of
separation of powers.
3. The Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II and III of the Constitution are not
among the procedural or structural provisions of the Constitution that tend to be
strictly enforced. They thus have little or no substantive bite. In other words, it
is rarely, if ever, possible to rely on a Vesting Clause to provide an answer to a
separation of powers controversy.
4. As a corollary to proposition 3, in general, separation of powers
controversies are rarely if ever resolved by determining which branch of
government is the proper branch to engage in a particular activity. In other
words, separation of powers controversies are not resolved by determining the
nature of a government action and then assigning the performance of that action
to the branch with the power to engage in that category of action.
5. Building on propositions 3 and 4, most government actions can
substantively be performed by more than one branch. Each branch must
observe the constitutional procedural and structural requirements that apply to
it.
6. Building on proposition 5, the identity of the actor performing the
action and not the nature of the action itself usually determines what sort of
action is being performed. For example, when Congress acts, it is legislating
and when an administrative agency acts it is executing the law, even if the
action taken is, in substance, identical.
6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1656452

Beermann, Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers
7. The strongest evidence that a power is assigned to a particular branch is
an explicit textual commitment of that action to the branch, not because of a
more general principle of separation of powers. When a power has been
assigned to a particular branch, no other branch is allowed to exercise that
function unless the Constitution explicitly permits it to.
These are the most important propositions to the understanding of
separation of powers presented in this article. There is, in addition, a pair of
minor propositions that help understand how separation of powers
understandings have developed. These are:
8. Informal pressure on the holder of a power to exercise it in a particular
way does not violate separation of powers; and
9. Separation of powers norms may be underenforced judicially. In other
words, the constitutional ideal may involve a stricter understanding of
separation of powers than what the federal courts are willing to enforce.

A. Separation of powers particulars.
I begin by elaborating on proposition 1:
1. The bulk of separation of powers analysis comprises the application of
the various specific procedural and structural provisions contained in the
Constitution and not an overarching theory of separation of powers.
Although the principle was clearly on the minds of the Framers, unlike state
constitutions, the Constitution of the United States does not refer directly to
separation of powers. Rather, the Constitution contains numerous particular
structural provisions that create a government under which, by and large,
separation of powers is observed. While nearly all of the Constitution’s
structural provisions bear some relation to separation of powers, some focus
specifically on separation of powers issues. 10

10

The key separation of powers provisions of Article I include the Incompatibility clause, which
prohibits Members of Congress from also serving in any other federal office; the procedures in
Article I for passing bills and presenting them to the President for signature or veto; the
enumerated powers of Article I § 8 (including the Necessary and Proper Clause); and the
prohibition on Bills of Attainder. In Article II, the key separation of powers provisions include
the prohibition against changing the President’s compensation during the term; the designation
of the President as Commander in Chief; the clause allowing the President to require written
opinions from Department Heads; the grant to the President of the power to make treaties and

7
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When separation of powers controversies arise, they almost always turn on the
meaning and application of one or more of the Constitution’s particular
structural or procedural provisions, rather than on a general separation of
powers standard. Perhaps this is because the Framers foresaw many potential
threats to separation of powers and addressed them in the Constitution. The
best example of this is the Incompatibility Clause, which, as noted, prohibits
simultaneous service in Congress and another branch of government. Perhaps it
would violate a general principle of separation of powers for a Member of
Congress to serve in the Executive Branch as well. 11 Because of the existence
of the Incompatibility Clause, we will never need to explore that issue.
Although separation of powers principles are relevant to construing the Clause,
the primary element of analysis, should a dispute over congressional service
arise, would be the Clause itself, not general principles.
The particular structural and procedural provisions of the Constitution establish
a form of government that is best described as “separation of powers with
checks and balances.” The key structural elements of this form of government
are: no simultaneous service in the legislative and executive branches of
government, independent election of the President and Congress, an
independent judiciary with life tenure and protected compensation, the
requirement that all laws be passed by both Houses of Congress and presented
to the President who has the power to veto them, appointment of executive
__________________________________________________________________
appoint officers of the United States, both with Senate confirmation; the provision empowering
the President to receive foreign ambassadors; the imposition on the President of the duty to take
care that that laws are faithfully executed; the provisions, now amended, providing for
independent election of the President; and the provision making clear that the President and
Vice President are subject to impeachment and removal for treason, bribery and “other high
crimes and misdemeanors.” Article III’s key separation of powers provisions include the
specification that the inferior courts are “ordained and established” by Congress; that the federal
judges serve “during good behavior” at a compensation that cannot be diminished; and that
Congress has the power, subject to limits, to declare the punishment for treason. While there are
numerous additional provisions that relate in some way to separation of powers, these are the
most important.
11
Even though the separation of legislative and executive personnel might seem fundamental to
Americans, it is unclear whether it would really violate separation of powers to allow Members
of Congress to serve also as Officers of the United States. Ronald Krotoszynski has pointed out
that this aspect of the U.S. Constitution has not been adopted elsewhere. See Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot (Not) Heard ‘Round the World: Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S.
Preoccupation with the Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers, 51 Boston College L.
Rev. 1 (2010). Congresional service as Officers of the United States would not necessarily
concentrate legislative and executive power in the same hands because passing laws would still
require positive votes from hundreds of legislators not serving in the executive branch. But
such a system would be difficult to police without a strict numerical limitation on the number of
Members of Congress allowed to serve in the Executive Branch. This is why a complete ban
may be the more sensible rule.

8
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branch officials and ambassadors and the like by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, 12 the Constitution’s specification of the President’s
military and foreign affairs powers and the imposition on the President of the
duty to faithfully execute the laws. While there are many additional elements
that help shape the structure of the government, these features provide a fairly
good outline. Change one of these provisions and the form of government
would begin to look different from what we have; change a few and we have a
different system.
There are separation of powers issues that do not turn on the application of one
of the particular structural or procedural provisions, such as the degree to which
Congress may limit the President’s power to remove officials executing the law,
the nondelegation doctrine, which regulates how much discretion Congress may
delegate to others, and the limitations on adjudication outside of Article III
courts. As we shall see, when analysis turns away from the application of a
particular provision to a more general separation of powers standard, the courts
tend to be very forgiving, finding a violation of separation of powers only in
extreme circumstances. 13
Elaboration of proposition 2 will help understand this important aspect of
separation of powers law:
2. Building on proposition 1, the courts generally enforce the procedural
and structural provisions of the Constitution strictly. When, however, a
separation of powers controversy cannot be resolved with reference to a
particular provision of the Constitution, the courts apply a very forgiving
standard and are unlikely to find a violation of the general principle of
separation of powers.
During the 1980s, there was a revival of attention to basic principles of
separation of powers. Devices Congress had used to augment its influence and
12

Appointment of judges by the President is not necessary for the system of separation of
powers. Judicial independence I s ensured by their tenure and protected compensation.
However, given that the Appointments Clause allocates the power to appoint judges to the
President, any effort by Congress to appoint judges or delegate their appointment away from the
President is likely to fail as violating a particular structural provision of the Constitution.
13
There is some chance that we are about to witness substantial changes in separation of
powers analysis. In the PCAOB decision, the Court struck down a removal provision on
separation of powers principles separate and apart from the Constitution’s specific procedural
and structural provisions. Perhaps the law will move in a stricter direction, but for now, that
decision appears consistent with prior law and differs, if at all, at a certain rhetorical level, but
not as a matter of substance.

9
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control (and decrease that of the President) over the execution of the law were
challenged in court on constitutional grounds. By and large, success in these
attacks turned on whether a particular provision had been violated. When an
attack boils down to an alleged violation of the general principle of separation
of powers, it usually fails. 14
The best example of this is the decision in INS v. Chadha, 15 in which the
Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto. The legislative veto is a device
designed to increase Congress’s control over the execution of the laws. Laws
containing legislative veto provisions allowed Congress or a sub-set of
Congress, such as a single House or in extreme cases a single committee, to
disapprove of executive action without participation of the President. The
legislative veto had been employed in many contexts, including review of
agency regulations and oversight of agency spending. In Chadha’s case, after
the Department of Justice decided to suspend Chadha’s deportation, the House
of Representatives invoked the legislative veto provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act 16 and vetoed the suspension. Under the terms of the Act, the
House’s vote was legally sufficient to invalidate the suspension, which would
result in Chadha being deported pursuant to the pre-suspension finding of
deportability.
The Court’s reasoning in Chadha spelled the end of all legislative vetoes. The
decision was not, however, based on a general principle of separation of powers.
Rather, the Court held that the legislative veto violated two particular structural
14

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Public Citizen v. United States Department of
Justice, 491 U.S. 438 (1989), may be the most explicit statement of this understanding at the
Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy explained that the Court is strict when Congress attempts to
interfere with the President’s exercise of a textually committed executive power and is much
more forgiving when the President can claim interference only with “the general grant to the
President of the ‘executive Power.’” 491 U.S. at 484 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Unfortunately,
in my view Justice Kennedy erred when he concluded that it would violate separation of powers
to apply the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App., to the President’s utilization of
the American Bar Association for advice on judicial appointments. See id. at 482-89. In Justice
Kennedy’s view, requiring the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary to abide by
FACA’s organizational, openness and recordkeeping requirements “would constitute a direct
and real interference with the President’s exclusive responsibility to nominate federal judges.”
Id. at 488. Because nothing in FACA limits the President’s choice of nominees, I disagree
with Justice Kennedy’s characterization of application of FACA as a “direct and real
interference” with the President’s appointment power. If anything, it is indirect since it does not
address the appointments themselves but only a part of the process of deciding on a nominee. I
do not mean to venture an opinion on whether application of FACA in this and other contexts
constitutes an unconstitutional interference with the President’s powers under the more general
separation of powers standard.
15
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
16
8 U.S.C. § 1254.

10
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provisions of the Constitution, the Presentment and Bicameralism
requirements. 17 Presentment requires that all laws passed by Congress be
presented to the President for signature or veto. Bicameralism provides that any
bill or other congressional action be passed by both Houses before it can
become law. Reliance on bicameralism invalidated all one-House vetoes.
Reliance on presentment invalidated legislative vetoes altogether.
The most difficult issue in Chadha was determining that bicameralism and
presentment actually applied to the legislative veto. In order to determine that
bicameralism and presentment applied to the House’s action in Chadha, the
Court had to construct a definition of legislation to which the two requirements
apply. Had the Court constructed a substantive definition of legislation and then
stated that all such actions are subject to bicameralism and presentment,
proposition 1 would be incorrect and proposition 2 would be beside the point.
But the Court did not construct a substantive definition of legislation. Rather, it
constructed a procedural and highly practical definition, stating that the House
exercised legislative power in Chadha because it “took action that had the
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all
outside the Legislative Branch.” 18 Stated more generally, Congress, or a subset
of Congress, exercises legislative power whenever it acts in a way that changes
anyone’s legal rights outside the legislative branch of government.
This understanding of the nature of the legislative power is built upon the
underlying separation of powers premise that Congress does not have the power
to do anything but legislate, at least when it wants its actions to have legal
effect. Basically, what the Court said was that anything Congress does that
purports to have legal effect constitutes the exercise of Congress’ legislative
power and is thus subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements.
There is no conceptual analysis of the nature of legislative power whatsoever. 19
This aspect of the opinion has been criticized as formalistic. The attack on this
aspect of Chadha is more effective when combined with the sensible argument
that the legislative veto actually supports separation of powers because it allows
Congress to effectively supervise the exercise of delegated power. However,

17

U.S. Const. Art. I § 7 cl. 2&3.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951
19
The Chadha Court’s explanation for why agencies are not required to utilize bicameralism
and presentment when they take actions that change people’s rights and duties is discussed infra
at x.
18

11
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this argument, built as it is on general separation of powers principles, was
irrelevant to the Court’s decision.
Did Chadha take a formalistic view of the legislative power? In one sense it did
not. It did not depend on a highly abstract conceptual concoction concerning
the nature of particular exercises of power. Rather, it is an effects test under
which the determination of whether a congressional action is legislative is made
based on the purported impact of the action, not on its nature or form. In
another sense, however, it is somewhat formalistic because the Court did not
support its analysis with arguments drawn on the policies underlying separation
of powers. Justice White’s dissenting opinion made the very practical, nonformalistic point, mentioned above, that the legislative veto can be restorative of
separation of powers because it allows Congress to supervise executive exercise
of delegated power. 20 However, the invalidation of the legislative veto can be
supported by the same argument—the legislative veto concentrated power in the
hands of the entity exercising the veto. For example, allowing the House of
Representatives unilaterally to veto the cancellation of Chadha’s deportation or
override an agency regulation concentrates power in the House, and for all the
reasons power is divided and subject to checks and balances, is inferior to
requiring those actions to go through bicameralism and presentment.
The criticism of Chadha and similar opinions as formalistic is a plea for more
flexibility, for allowing the Constitution to adapt to changes either in society or
in the way the structure of government has developed. The main argument in
favor of the legislative veto is that the Constitution should be allowed to adapt
to the increase in delegation of discretionary power to agencies. What we have
seen and shall see is that the Court is not receptive to this sort of argument when
it appears that Congress has designed a process that is inconsistent with one of
the specific structural elements of the Constitution that forms the separation of
powers.
Because the Court found that the legislative veto violated the specific
constitutional procedure for the exercise of the legislative power, it did not
reach more general questions of separation of powers. Much the same can be
said for the other separation of powers decisions in recent times. In this area,
the Court is remarkably consistent—it strictly applies the particular structural or
procedural provisions, and if it finds no violation of one of these provisions, it
upholds the government action on a very forgiving standard.
Decisions
20

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 et seq. (White, J. dissenting). Justice White consistently argued for
flexibility in separation of powers analysis. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 et
seq. (1986) (White, J. dissenting).
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regarding the exercise of the appointments power are the best remaining
examples here.
In several decisions, the Court has reviewed the constitutionality of the
appointment of Officers of the United States. In Buckley v. Valeo, 21 Congress
specified an unorthodox procedure for appointing members of the Federal
Election Commission. Appointments were made, two each, by the Speaker of
the House, the President Pro Tempores of the Senate and the President of the
United States, all subject to confirmation by both Houses of Congress. This was
contrary to the Appointments Clause which specifies that Officers of the United
States are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
or, if Congress specifies for inferior officers, by the President, a Department
Head or Court of Law, acting alone. 22 Confirmation by both Houses was also
arguably contrary to the Constitution’s specification of advice and consent
power in the Senate alone. The Court had no trouble holding that officials
appointed in this manner were not Officers of the United States and thus could
not exercise authority pursuant to the law. 23 Again, because it found the process
contrary to the Appointments Clause, the Court did not find it necessary to
consider more general separation of powers considerations.
The decision in Clinton v. New York, 24 invalidating the Line Item Veto Act,25
follows the pattern of Chadha and Buckley. The Court found that the line item
veto procedure created by the Act was inconsistent with the Constitution’s
process for making (and amending) law, and thus it was not necessary for the
Court to address general separation of powers questions. The Line Item Veto
Act specified that within five days after signing an appropriations bill or a bill
containing targeted tax benefits, the President could specify particular items in
the bill for cancellation, which under the Act would then lose their legal effect.
The Court viewed this as inconsistent with the Constitution’s veto provision
under which the President must sign or reject bills in their entirety, and with the
process for making law under which bicameralism and presentment are required
to alter anything in a bill that has been signed by the President. Once a bill is
signed by the President, each and every provision it contains becomes law, and
nothing the President can do unilaterally can alter its legal effect. All the
21

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23
Other methods of appointment may be applied to officials of the other branches who do not
exercise authority pursuant to the law. For example, Congress may appoint officials who help
in the process of legislation. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137-38.
24
525 U.S. 417 (1998).
25
2 U.S.C. § 692,
22
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practical arguments about the necessity for an effective method of deficit
reduction and the degree of discretion Presidents traditionally have over the
actual spending of appropriated funds were not relevant to the basic structural
reality.
In all of these cases, the Court applies the expressio unis canon to the procedural
and structural provisions of the Constitution, disallowing innovation with regard
to those matters spelled out in the text of the Constitution. This helps explain
why innovations such as the legislative veto and the line item veto are
unconstitutional, and why Congress may not require approval of presidential
appointments by the House of Representatives.
B. Separation of Powers Leniency
As stated in proposition 2, once it is clear that no particular procedural or
structural provision of the Constitution has been violated, separation of powers
analysis becomes highly forgiving and deferential to Congress’s determinations
of appropriate governmental structure. Just how forgiving is best illustrated by
the nondelegation doctrine and the controversy over the appointment and
removal of the Independent Counsel (IC) in Morrison v. Olson. 26 The
nondelegation doctrine is discussed in connection with propositions 3, 5 and 6,
below. Here I elaborate on appointment and removal in Morrison.
The position of IC was created in reaction to corruption in the administration of
Richard Nixon, during which special prosecutor Archibald Cox was fired when
his investigation got too close to the President. Under the relevant provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act, 27 Congress specified that on the request of the
Attorney General after finding cause to investigate whether an Executive
Branch official had violated the law, an IC would be appointed by a special
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The IC was
not subject to direct supervision by the Attorney General or any other
government official, and could be removed only for cause and only by the
personal action of the Attorney General.
Appointment by a Court of Law is permissible under the terms of the
Appointments Clause if the IC is an inferior officer, which the Supreme Court
found to be the case. Once that was settled, the remaining question was whether
the entire arrangement (including the appointment method, the lack of
26
27

487 U.S. 654 (1988).
28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591
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supervision and the removal restriction) violated separation of powers. In this
regard, the operative question became whether the Act violates the separation of
powers by reducing the President's ability to control the prosecutorial powers
wielded by the independent counsel too much. The Court stated this as
“whether the Act, taken as a whole, does not violate the principle of separation
of powers by unduly interfering with the Executive Branch’s role.” 28 This is a
discretionary and forgiving standard, inviting the Court to make an independent
judgment concerning whether the traditional presidential control over the
machinery of prosecution has been interfered with too much. Despite strong
dissenting arguments from Justice Scalia that the presence of an IC would
undermine the ability of the President to command the loyalty of executive
branch officials who might be subject to an IC investigation, 29 the Court found
that the Attorney General’s removal authority and the statutory requirement that
the IC follow Justice Department guidelines when possible, and additional
features of the appointment and conduct of the IC, meant that the Act did not
violate the separation of powers. 30 The Court’s scrutiny, under general
separation of powers principles, was very deferential to the congressional
judgment that the IC was necessary and not excessively intrusive into
presidential prerogatives.
It should be noted that the Court’s generally forgiving treatment of alleged
separation of powers transgressions in Morrison extended beyond those areas
governed only by the general “undue interference” standard that governs when
no particular procedural or structural provision applies. 31 Although the Court
strictly requires anyone exercising authority pursuant to the law to be appointed
under the procedures required by the Appointments Clause, the Court has not
been very strict when applying the provisions of the Appointments Clause that
govern the appointment of inferior officers, including the basic determination of
which officers are inferior. The Court appeared to bend over backwards to
determine that the IC was an inferior officer within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause even though the IC was not subject to much in the way of
supervision by any superior. 32 The Court has also deferred to Congress’s
28

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 658.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712-13 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
30
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695-96.
31
Removal of Officers of the United States is one of the most significant areas not governed by
a particular procedural or structural provision of the Constitution. The separation of powers
aspects of removal are discussed in connection with propositions 3 and 7, below.
32
The IC was subject to removal for cause by the Attorney General, 28 U.S.C. § 596(a), and
was required to follow Department of Justice policy to the extent possible. See 28 U.S.C. §
594(f) (“except to the extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this
29
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judgment concerning the appropriate appointing authority for inferior officers
by allowing Congress wide latitude in assigning appointment authority over
executive officers to a court and in designating “Departments” and Heads of
Departments” for appointments purposes.
The PCAOB decision also illustrates this leniency concerning the definition of
inferior officers and the designation of departments and department heads with
appointive authority. PCAOB members are appointed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, an independent, bi-partisan agency heading by five
commissioners, one of whom serves as Chair. The constitutionality of this
appointment process depends on two issues, first whether PCAOB members are
inferior officers and second whether SEC Commissioners are department heads.
On both scores, the Court ruled in favor of SEC authority. The Court found
that PCAOB members are inferior officers because they are subject to removal
and supervision by the SEC, even though removal is only for pretty extreme
cause, much more protective of Board members than the standard governing
removal of most independent agency heads and the IC. 33 And on whether the
SEC Commissioners are Department Heads capable of appointing inferior
officers, the Court adopted a practical definition of “department” as including
any “freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or
contained within any other such component” and determined that nothing in the
Appointments Clause is inconsistent with such a department being headed by
multiple commissioners. 34
III. General Separation of Powers Controversies
A. The Removal of Officers of the United States
The Court’s acceptance of congressional power to restrict the removal of
Officers of the United States both tests and illustrates the claim that the Court is
generally lenient when applying separation of powers standards not embodied in
a particular procedural or structural provision of the Constitution. No provision
in the Constitution addresses the routine removal of Officers of the United
States. It would be implausible to argue that impeachment is the exclusive
__________________________________________________________________
chapter, comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice
respecting enforcement of the criminal laws”).
33
After the Court determined that PCAOB members must be subject to at will removal by the
SEC, it applied the standard it had announced in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662663 (1997), to determine that that PCAOB members were inferior officers subject to
appointment by, inter alia, “Heads of Departments.” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
34
130 S. Ct. at 3162, 3163.
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removal provision, as that would place the tenure of all officials on par with that
of federal judges whose lifetime tenure (absent impeachment) is explicitly
provided for in the text of the Constitution. This would also be incompatible
with the long tradition of patronage, under which a new President would appoint
loyalists to virtually every position in the federal government.
Because there is no constitutional clause governing the routine removal of
executive branch officials, controversies over removal test the proposition that
general notions of separation of powers have little bite. In order to appreciate
this, a somewhat extended look at the Court’s jurisprudence concerning
restrictions on presidential removal of executive officials is necessary.
For many years, Congress statutorily required the advice and consent of the
Senate for the removal of certain officials, and the House impeached President
Andrew Johnson for refusing to obey one such provision. However, in the early
twentieth century, in the Myers decision overturning a statute that required the
advice and consent of the Senate before the President could fire a local
postmaster, the Court categorically rejected any role for the Senate in the
removal of officials, declaring such participation contrary to separation of
powers, and that continues to be established doctrine. 35 Much of the language of
the Myers opinion, written by Chief Justice and former President William
Howard Taft, supports relatively stringent review of congressional efforts to
interfere with the President’s supervision of the Executive Branch. The Court
also relied on the Take Care Clause, implying that requiring Senate permission
to remove an Executive Branch official would unduly interfere with the
President’s ability to faithfully execute the law. 36
The primary argument made in defense of the requirement of Senatorial advice
and consent for removal of executive officials was that since the Senate had the
power to participate in the appointment of Officers of the United States, the
Senate could also participate in the removal, through a similar advice and
consent power. There is apparently good historical evidence that this was the

35

Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
“The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of advising
and consenting to appointment, and when the grant of the executive power is enforced by the
express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the necessity for
including within the executive power as conferred the exclusive power of removal.” Myers, 272
U.S. at 122. The Court further observed that without the power to remove, the President could
not “discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.” Id. at
135.
36
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understanding at the time the Constitution was adopted. 37 The Court rejected
this argument based on constitutional text, the President’s need to supervise
officials engaged in the execution of the laws and the Court’s reading of
particular constitutional history on the subject.
The Court distinguished senatorial participation in removal from participation in
appointments on three bases. The first is that the only reason the Senate is
allowed to participate in the former is that the Appointments Clause explicitly
so provides. The lack of a textual reference to Senatorial participation in
removal strongly implies that the Framers did not anticipate any such
participation especially in light of the specific reference to Senate advice and
consent on appointments. Myers refutes the notion that the advice and consent
power over appointments implies an advice and consent power over removals.
To the contrary, the Court explained that there were specific reasons for
requiring the Senate’s advice and consent over appointments, and those reasons
do not apply to removal. Second, the Court relied on the President’s need to
supervise the execution of the laws. While the President may not find it ideal
that the Senate has power to reject nominees to executive positions, once an
official is confirmed and appointed, the President’s strongest guarantee of
efficiency and loyalty is the removal power. If the President is forced to share
that power with the Senate, the President is effectively sharing the executive
power with the Senate. This is not true with regard to Senate participation in
appointment, since once the nomination is confirmed, the Senate loses virtually
all formal control over the official.
Third, the Myers Court found specific constitutional history in support of its
view that the Senate could not participate in the removal of executive officials. 38
The Court examined the debates surrounding the advice and consent power and
the general issue of removal of officials and found strong evidence that the
Framers meant to lodge the removal power exclusively with the President,
mainly for the practical reason discussed above. The opinion relies for its
bottom line rejection of Senatorial advice and consent for removals on this
37

The dissenting opinions of Justices McReynolds and Brandeis in Myers argue, based on
constitutional history and consistent practice, that the Constitution allows Congress to require
the advice and consent of the Senate for the discharge of inferior officers. See Myers, 272 U.S.
at 178-239 (McReynolds, J. dissenting); 272 U.S. at 240-95 (Brandeis, J. dissenting). Justice
Holmes’s brief dissent argues that senatorial advice and consent is appropriate because
Congress created the office to which the requirement applies. In other words, the greater power
to abolish the office includes the lesser power to require the Senate’s advice and consent to
discharge the officer. Myers, 272 U.S. at 295 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
38
Myers, 272 U.S. at 119-129.
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specific evidence more than on the general notion that removal is by nature an
executive function. In fact, the Court’s conclusion is that Senate participation in
removal was specifically rejected.
Therefore, Myers is not contrary to the portrait of separation of powers offered
in this essay. The primary bases for finding a constitutional problem with
Senatorial advice and consent for removal is the effect on the President’s ability
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed and the specific rejection by the
Framers of a role for Congress in removal. Thus, although there is language in
Myers and perhaps other opinions that supports a more conceptual form of
separation of powers analysis, the bedrock separation of powers principle for
which the decision stands is the same as current law, that Congress may not take
action that unduly interferes with the President’s ability to execute the law.
There are two rules in this area, one that dates back to Myers and one that dates
back only to the PCAOB decision—Congress or a subset of Congress may not
participate in the removal of executive officials through any sort of advice and
consent requirement, and if an official can be removed only for cause by a lower
level official, the official with removal power must be subject to at-will removal
by the President. Given the lenient attitude the Court has taken toward removal
restrictions which was largely reaffirmed in the PCAOB decision, the more
conceptual elements of Myers are insufficient to undercut the explanation of
separation of powers offered here.
Regardless of its basis or bases, the Meyers decision’s restrictive view of
Congress’s authority to restrict the removal of officials did not last long. After
Myers, the Court twice approved restrictions on the removal of independent
agency personnel, 39 once even reading the removal restriction into a statute that
did not actually contain one. 40 In these cases, the Court did not abandon the
Myers Court’s view that the President must have complete control over those
engaged in executive functions. The Court found that the President did not need
control over officials engaged in what it termed “quasi-legislative” and “quasijudicial” functions because agencies performing such functions “cannot in any
proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive.” 41 These
decisions apparently left intact the Myers Court’s endorsement of complete
39

See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (Congress may restrict
removal of Federal Trade Commissioner to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office”); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (President may not remove member of
adjudicatory War Claims Commission even though statute does not explicitly address removal
standard).
40
See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353-54.
41
Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628. See also Wiener, 357 U.S. at 352.
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presidential control over the removal of officials exercising purely executive
functions such as delivering the mail or, presumably, investigating and
prosecuting alleged criminals.
The distinction of Myers in Humprey’s Executor is the exact sort of conceptual
analysis (characterizing and sorting powers) that I claim is not the mode of
analysis the Supreme Court applies to separation of powers controversies.
Thus, had the law remained as it appears to have settled after these decisions,
the second half of proposition 2 would not be accurate at least with regard to
separation of powers controversies concerning removal restrictions. In such
cases, there was an apparently strong rejection of restrictions on the removal of
Officers of the United States engaged in purely executive functions. This
changed, however, with the Court’s approval of restrictions on the removal of
Independent Counsels in Morrison v. Olson. In that decision, the Court
discarded the executive versus quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative mode of
analysis of removal restrictions in favor of application of the general separation
of powers standard: “the real question is whether the removal restrictions are of
such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his
constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be
analyzed in that light.” The President’s constitutional duty is the duty to “take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 42 Thus, removal restrictions are
unconstitutional only if, in the Court’s judgment, they unduly hinder the
President’s ability to fulfill the constitutional role of the presidency.
Although the PCAOB decision did not, on its face, adjust the standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on the removal of Officers of the
United States, it appears to be at least a modest step toward stricter application
of the standard. By law, PCOAB members are removable only by the SEC
Commissioners and only for pretty extreme cause. 43 SEC Commissioners are
removable by the President, but only for cause under the standard governing
removal of Federal Trade Commissioners evaluated in Humphrey’s Executor. 44
In evaluating this situation, the Court asked whether the Board was sufficiently
42

Morrison, 497 U.S. at 691. In similar language, the Court declared that “we cannot say that
the imposition of a ‘good cause’ standard for removal by itself unduly trammels on executive
authority” and “we simply do not see how the President's need to control the exercise of that
discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of
constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President”). Id. at 691-92.
43
See 15 U. S. C. § 7217(d)(3).
44
No statute actually provides SEC Commissioners with this protection from discharge, but the
Court accepted the parties’ agreement to this standard for purposes of the litigation. This is
discussed further below.
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accountable to the President. Although the Court did not recite the general
separation of powers question of whether the removal restriction unduly
interferes with the President’s ability to fulfill the constitutional functions of the
presidency, that is clearly the motivation for concern over whether the President
has sufficient control over the Board’s activities. At a rhetorical level, the
PCAOB Court seemed very concerned that restrictions on removal of officials
executing the law must not be so great that the President cannot, as a practical
matter, control their work at least to some extent. The Court declared the forcause restriction on SEC removal of Board members unconstitutional because
the President could not remove SEC members without cause. The Court found
that two levels of for-cause restriction on the removal of an official executing
the law impermissibly reduced the official’s accountability to the President.
Under the Court’s reasoning, Congress may entrust removal of officials to a
subordinate of the President, but when it does so, either the official so entrusted
must be removable at will by the President or the official subject to removal
must be removable at will by the official with removal power. Because PCAOB
members were removable only by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which is headed by commissioners removable only for cause by the President,
the Court held that PCAOB members must be removable without cause.
This understanding is a particularized application of the principle that no branch
may prevent another branch from fulfilling its constitutionally-assigned
function. In the case of removal, Congress could cripple the President’s ability
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed by preventing the President
from removing incompetent, corrupt or disloyal officials. Normally this
standard is not very demanding and is rarely violated. However, in the PCAOB
decision, the Court appears to have created a per se rule against double for cause
restrictions. 45
Does this signal a tightening of norms governing the permissibility of removal
restrictions? It’s much too early to tell although in general, an affirmative
answer appears unlikely. There is one signal in the Court’s opinion that is
consistent with a tightening of standards—the Court’s novel invocation in the
separation of powers context of a potential lack of political accountability for
45

Another way in which the PCAOB decision appears novel is that the Court itself reformed the
removal provision, declaring that PCAOB members are removable without cause by the SEC.
In the past, the normal practice has been for the Court to declare that improperly appointed or
removable officials cannot engage in execution of the law rather than reform the offending
removal or appointment provision. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (official
removable by Congress cannot execute the law); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (officials
appointed by Members of Congress cannot execute the law).
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PCOAB decisions if Board members are insulated from control by either the
SEC or the President. 46 On the other side, however, the signals point in the
opposite direction, especially the Court’s willingness to imply a for-cause
restriction on removal of SEC commissioners even though no statute protects
SEC Commissioners from removal without cause.
According to the applicable statute, SEC Commissioners are appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for five year terms. 47
Removal of Commissioners is not mentioned in the statute. The Court relied on
an agreement of the parties that Commissioners may not be fired without cause,
based perhaps on a long term understanding that Congress intends to protect
heads of independent agencies from at will presidential removal. 48 This
presents something of a puzzle. The basis for the Court’s disapproval of double
for-cause protection for officials exercising executive power is to ensure that the
President has some level of control over the execution of the law. But with
regard to single for cause protection of independent agency heads, not only did
the Court not express any reservation about the notion that the President’s
power over the execution of the law is limited by the typical for-cause limitation
on discharge of independent agency heads, it embraced it by consenting to an
implied for-cause restriction for SEC members. If a strong principle of
presidential removal existed, it would seem that Congress should at least be
required to explicitly legislate protection from discharge for independent agency
heads. Thus, if there is anything revolutionary about the PCAOB decision it
may be that the independence of independent agencies appears to have achieved
a quasi-constitutional status, such that Congress would have to explicitly grant
the President unlimited removal power to overcome the presumption of

46

As the Court stated, “Without a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot
‘determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of
pernicious measures ought really to fall.’” PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3155, quoting The Federalist
No. 72, p. 476 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). This concern for clear lines of political
accountability is the underlying normative basis for the Court’s prohibition on federal
commandeering of state and local officials to enforce federal law, which the Court created as
limitations on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce in the 1990s. See Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
47
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(a).
48
130 S. Ct. at 3148-49. A test of this understanding would occur if the President discharged a
member of the Commission without cause and defended a suit by the terminated commissioner
on the basis that no statute protects the Commissioner’s tenure. It would be surprising if the
Court stuck to its view in PCAOB and held that a for-cause restriction on removal is implicit for
independent agency members in the absence of legislation to that effect. Perhaps the Court
would view it as implicit in appointment of Commissioners for five year terms. If the Court
held that Commissioners are terminable at will, then presumably it would be constitutional to
require cause for the SEC to discharge PCAOB members.
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protection. This is clearly inconsistent with a newly restrictive view of
separation of powers.
In sum, although the PCAOB decision may be somewhat stricter than had been
the case with regard to restrictions on the President’s power to remove Officers
of the United States, separation of powers jurisprudence has not been
demanding when no particular procedural or structural provision of the
Constitution is implicated. This brings us to proposition 3.
B. The Vesting Clauses
3. The Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II and III of the Constitution are not
among the procedural or structural provisions of the Constitution that tend
to be strictly enforced. They thus have little or no substantive bite. In
other words, it is rarely, if ever, possible to rely on a Vesting Clause to
provide an answer to a separation of powers controversy.
That the Vesting Clauses are not among the procedural or structural provisions
that tend to be strictly enforced should be apparent from the preceding
discussion. If they were, then when more specific provisions were found not to
have been violated, like the Appointments Clause, or the Bicameralism and
Presentment provisions, the next step in the analysis would be to ask whether a
Vesting Clause had been violated. 49 And it would follow that a Vesting Clause
was violated whenever a branch was deprived of complete control over the
performance of its assigned constitutional function. Proponents of expansive
presidential power under what has become to be called the “unitary executive”
theory take this tack. They would argue, for example, that because the
Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act diluted
presidential control over the performance of the executive function of
prosecution, it is unconstitutional under the Vesting Clause of Article II.
49

Some scholars locate a general principle of separation of powers, and other non-textual
limitations on governmental power, in Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause, theorizing that a
law that violates separation of powers cannot be “proper for carrying into execution” any
federal power. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power:
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267 (1993); U.S. Const.
Art. I § 8. Lawson and Granger’s argument is based largely on state constitutional separation of
powers provisions that used the word “proper” to refer to matters within the jurisdiction of a
particular branch of government. See Lawson & Granger at 291-97. Lawson & Granger go on
to argue that the Framers incorporated this jurisdictional understanding into the U.S.
Constitution through the use of the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at
298-308. Whether they and other scholars who express similar opinions are correct is irrelevant
to this essay which attempts only to describe separation of powers as practiced and understood
in current law.
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Vesting Clause enforcement would require exactly the sort of analysis this essay
argues rarely if ever occurs. A challenger would claim that Congress has taken
a power that belongs to one branch and unconstitutionally either allocated it to a
different branch or restricted the proper branch’s complete control over its
exercise. Whether it would have been more faithful to the Constitution for the
law to have developed that way, it has not, and while the Vesting Clauses have
important legal ramifications, 50 they are not enforced strictly the way other
structural provisions of the Constitution are.
The best illustration of this fact of constitutional analysis involves the
nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine embodies a fundamental
separation of powers principle, that Congress may not delegate away its
legislative power. In a sense it is a truism since the Constitution empowers
Congress and only Congress to pass laws (subject to the possibility of
presidential veto and judicial invalidation). But it has long been recognized that
delegation of excessive discretion to Executive Branch officials, even without
the authority to actually promulgate laws, implicates the legislative power as a
matter of substance if not of form. To avoid delegation of legislative power,
Congress must legislate an “intelligible principle” for agencies to follow when
filling in gaps and making policy under the law. 51 Even with regard to such a
fundamental element of separation of powers, because no particular clause
prohibits delegation of discretion (and because the Vesting Clause of Article I is
not understood as such a clause) the standard the Court applies to nondelegation
disputes is incredibly forgiving, bordering on a determination that the doctrine
is non-justiciable. 52 If the Vesting Clause of Article I were understood as
having separation of powers bite, it would be expected that the nondelegation
doctrine would be much less forgiving of executive exercise of discretionary
power to promulgate rules and take other action with the force of law. 53
Because in PCAOB, the Court began its analysis by quoting Article II’s Vesting
Clause, and because the Court’s opinion asserts that “the executive power
50

The Vesting Clauses do settle important structural matters. For example, we know from
Article I that only Congress has the power to pass laws and we know from Article II that there is
only one President of the United States. But under the Court’s jurisprudence, the Vesting
Clauses do not have much to say about the proper allocation of government power.
51
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
52
Justice Scalia stated in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001),
"we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible
degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’" (quoting
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
53
The dispute over whether the Constitution absolutely prohibits delegation of legislative power
is addressed below, with regard to proposition 6.
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included a power to oversee executive officers through removal” 54 the decision
may, appear, on the surface, to contradict the proposition that the Vesting
Clauses are not important to separation of powers doctrine. On closer analysis,
however, the decision is not substantially different from prior law. Had the
analysis stopped here and concluded that any limitation on the President’s
power to remove members of the PCAOB violated separation of powers, we
would be characterizing the decision as the opening gambit in the “Roberts
Court’s separation of powers revolution.” What we got instead, however, was a
relatively moderate swing toward greater presidential power and a tip of the hat
without clear meaning to the Vesting Clause of Article II.
The Court’s unusual explicit reliance on the Vesting Clause and its
characterization of the power to remove as an executive function does create an
air of expectancy concerning the next step in the Court’s separation of powers
jurisprudence. Further, the development, under the influence of the Vesting
Clause of the apparent per se rule that two levels of for cause protection are
unconstitutional raises the possibility that the Vesting Clause might, in the
future, be treated as a specific structural provision prohibiting excessive
limitations on presidential control over those aiding in the execution of the law.
So far, however, indications are that business as usual is the most likely
direction for the future.
C. Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch
The analysis thus far has concerned mainly the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and
II. Because the procedures for exercising the judicial power are not highly
specified in the text of the Constitution, the Vesting Clause of Article III may be
more important than the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II, and the nature of
the judicial power may thus be more relevant to understanding separation of
powers than the natures of the other governmental powers. The structural and
procedural aspects of the judicial power that are specified in the Constitution
include the maximum jurisdiction of the federal courts, the specification of the
Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction, the requirement of trial by
jury in criminal matters, the local venue requirement in criminal cases, the
evidentiary requirements for treason and allocation to Congress of the power to
establish lower federal courts.

54

PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3152.
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In addition to these matters that are spelled out in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has identified the essential attributes of the judicial power that are
reserved to the Article III courts. These include the entry of a final judgment,
presiding over jury trials and imposing criminal punishment. The prohibition
on Bills of Attainder makes judicial power over some aspects of criminal law
exclusive, and the restrictions on the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
give the judiciary some power over executive action involving imprisonment.
There are also limitations on Congress’s power to allocate jurisdiction over core
Article III cases to non-Article III tribunals. 55 The lack of specificity in the
Constitution concerning the essential attributes of the judicial power means that
most controversies over alleged allocation of judicial power to non-Article III
tribunals are evaluated under standards similar to the general separation of
powers standard that governs executive-legislative branch controversies that do
not involve a particular procedural or structural provision.
There is a great deal of federal adjudication outside the Article III courts in
institutions as varied as benefits agencies such as the Social Security
Administration, regulatory bodies such as the National Labor Relations Board
and licensing agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There are
also non-Article III institutions that are explicitly characterized as courts such as
the United States Tax Court. The typical separation of powers controversy
concerning Article III involves whether the establishment of a non-Article III
federal adjudicatory institution violates Article III because it exercises judicial
power that is constitutionally vested in the federal courts. This is one area in
which the Vesting Clause is usually invoked, but it has little effect on the actual
analysis or resolution of the controversies.
The general rule is that Congress has broad power to create non-Article III
adjudicatory institutions to decide categories of cases that have traditionally
been viewed as outside the core of Article III jurisdiction. The categories
include public rights (rights against the U.S. government), cases arising in
territorial courts and cases arising in military courts. The most important
category here is public rights. 56 The theory underlying the acceptance of non-

55

See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982);
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
56
The reasons behind acceptance of non-Article III territorial courts and courts-martial are
idiosyncratic and do not aid in understanding separation of powers doctrine. Non-Article III
territorial courts are necessary because when a state is formed in what was previously a
territory, the need for federal judges decreases dramatically because most of the work done by
the former territory’s courts will now be taken up by the state courts. Courts-martial have long
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Article III adjudication of public rights is that because the United States could
assert complete sovereign immunity or decide such claims in a non-adjudicatory
administrative manner, the use of an adjudicatory process does not transform
the decisionmaking process into an exercise of the Article III judicial power.
This notion is reinforced by the fact that the Supreme Court has long understood
claims agains the sovereign to be outside the original intent of Article III. 57
Private rights adjudication in a non-Article III federal tribunal presents a more
difficult Article III separation of powers question. In 1979, the Supreme Court
invalidated a new system of bankruptcy adjudication because it allowed the
non-Article III bankruptcy courts to adjudicate all claims involving the bankrupt
estate, including state common law claims between the bankrupt and another
private party. 58 Here we have a direct application of the Vesting Clause of
Article III—non-Article III federal tribunals cannot exercise the judicial power
of the United States.
Until relatively recently, it was unclear whether the Supreme Court would
embrace a strict standard condemning all non-Article III adjudication outside
the public rights, territorial courts and courts-martial areas. Early cases placed
restrictions on agency adjudication of private rights claims to preserve the
Article III courts’ dominant role in such adjudication. 59 The closest that a
highly restrictive view came to becoming law in recent years was in Justice
William Brennan’s plurality opinion in the case invalidating the bankruptcy
courts. 60 Ultimately the Court adopted a much more forgiving standard,
allowing federal adjudication of private rights claims in non-Article III tribunals
if the claims are closely related to a federal regulatory scheme and the statute
does not allow the non-Article III tribunal to assume the “essential attributes” of
Article III courts, such as the power to enter final judgments and the power to
preside over jury trials. 61 In language similar to the way the Court frames
separation of powers controversies concerning the powers of the other branches,
the Court has stated that the fundamental question concerning the
constitutionality of the assignment of adjudicatory power to a non-Article III
__________________________________________________________________
been part of the military structure and would not be considered part of the domain occupied by
the Article III courts.
57
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
58
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982).
59
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). In Crowell, the Court held that a federal agency
could adjudicate private rights claims as a sort of adjunct to the federal courts, with deferential
review of routine facts but de novo review of jurisdictional facts and questions of law.
60
Id.
61
See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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tribunal is whether it “impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the
Judicial Branch.” 62
In evaluating the constitutionality of adjudication in non-Article III federal
tribunals, it is important to distinguish between the exercise of the judicial
power of the United States and the mere use of an adjudicatory procedure.
What marks out this distinction is a combination of procedural and structural
aspects of the tribunal, most of which are not mentioned in the Constitution and
are referred to in the Court’s opinions as the “essential attributes of the judicial
power.” These essential attributes include the power to issue final judgments,
the lack of judicial review or review only on a highly deferential standard, the
power to issue writs of habeas corpus and preside over jury trials and
jurisdiction over state law claims. If a federal institution respects these
boundaries sufficiently, the fact that it makes decisions using an adjudicatory
process does not take it out of the realm of execution of the law and convert its
actions to the exercise of the judicial power of the United States. What is
special about this standard is that, because these attributes are not specified in
the Constitution, the Vesting Clause, together with a conceptual understanding
of the nature of the judicial power, play a greater role here than in separation of
powers controversies concerning the powers of Congress and the President.
IV. The Rejection of Conceptual Analysis
A. No Assignment of Powers
Proposition 4 is the conclusion to this part of the discussion:
4. As a corollary to proposition 3, in general, separation of powers
controversies are rarely if ever resolved by determining which branch of
government is the proper branch to engage in a particular activity. In
other words, separation of powers controversies are not resolved by
determining the nature of a government action and then assigning the
performance of that action to the branch with the power to engage in that
category of action.
As we have seen, separation of powers controversies are usually resolved by
asking two questions: first whether a specific structural or procedural provision
has been violated and, if not, whether the particular arrangement being
challenged “unduly interferes” with a branch’s ability to perform its assigned
62

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
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function in the government. None of the major separation of powers cases
except perhaps some concerning judicial power is decided conceptually by
asking whether a branch is exercising a power that properly belongs to another
branch. There are powerful practical reasons for this, having mainly to do with
the difficulty courts would face if they tried to construct mutually exclusive
definitions of the three types of government powers.
Consistent with this analysis, the Chadha Court defined the legislative power in
a practical way, basically by stating that anything that Congress does that
purports to have legal effect outside the legislative branch falls within the
legislative power. This is a fundamental separation of powers understanding—
each branch has only the power assigned to it by the Constitution, and when it
exercises governmental power each branch must follow whatever procedural or
structural provisions apply to it. Congress must act legislatively. The Courts
may not go beyond the resolution of Cases or Controversies. The President may
not act beyond the power delegated either by legislation or the Constitution
itself. In this regard, one of the more interesting points the Court made in
Morrison v. Olson is that because the Constitution specifies that Courts of Law
may appoint inferior officers, appointment of Officers of the United States is
not, constitutionally speaking, an exclusively executive function. 63
This is not to say that the nature of the power is always irrelevant. Although in
the vast majority of cases it is, sometimes conceptual analysis of the nature of a
power may be lurking just below the surface of a controversy. Arguably, for
example, the Court considers the power to remove officials executing the law as
an executive function. Impeachment and conviction by the House and Senate is
allowed only because the Constitution specifies it, not because it is a normal
legislative function. The Supreme Court denied the Senate a role in removal in
the Myers 64 case, and the more recent decision in the PCAOB case places the
power to remove as squarely within the executive power that is constitutionally
vested in the President. Even here, however, it is best to say that the President’s
removal power depends not on the nature of that power but on the potential for
any other arrangement to interfere with the performance of his constitutional
powers and duties. After all, the legislative and judicial branches have the
power to remove their own officials, and even hire them despite the
Appointments Clause. Thus, appointment and removal should not be viewed as
63

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695 (“the power to appoint inferior officers such as independent
counsel is not in itself an ‘executive’ function in the constitutional sense, at least when Congress
has exercised its power to vest the appointment of an inferior office in the ‘courts of Law.’”).
64
Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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executive functions except when the officials involved assist the President in
executing the law.
The PCAOB decision also illustrates that separation of powers decisions do not
depend on assignment of a function to a particular branch. In that case, the
Court found that the provisions governing removal of PCAOB members
contravened the separation of powers. Note however that the Court’s decision
was not that the power to discharge officers of the United States was in its
nature an executive function but rather that the removal restrictions unduly
impaired the President’s ability to carry out his constitutional obligation to “take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 65 Removal can be accomplished
legislatively as well. The Court has made it clear that when a legislature
abolishes a governmental position and, in effect, removes the incumbent official
from office, the legislative body is engaging in a legislative function. 66 Thus,
even the separation of powers analysis relevant to removal of officials executing
the law is best understood as based on general separation of powers principles
rather than the allocation of authority to a particular official or branch of
government.
B. Overlapping Powers
5. Building on propositions 3 and 4, most government actions can
substantively be performed by more than one branch. Each branch must
observe the constitutional procedural and structural requirements that
apply to it.
It is a fundamental reality of the U.S. government that more than one branch can
create the identical substantive law. To provide a simple example of this,
consider the specification of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS). Congress has empowered, indeed required, the EPA to establish
NAAQS for numerous pollutants. 67 EPA does this by promulgating regulations
pursuant to the procedures established by Congress. There is no doubt that
Congress itself could establish the NAAQS via the legislative process of
bicameralism and presentment. Assuming proper delegation of authority,
65

The Court refers to both the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause which illustrates how
removal disputes test the theory offered here. “We hold that such multilevel protection from
removal is contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President. The President
cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of
the officers who execute them.” PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3147.
66
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
67
See Clean Air Act § 109(a), 84 Stat. 1679, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a); Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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Congress and the EPA have concurrent power to establish NAAQS, with the
understanding that if Congress acts, its legislative determination supersedes any
standard set by the EPA.
We know from Chadha that if Congress wants to establish an NAAQS or reject
one established by the EPA, it must employ the constitutionally-specified
legislative process of bicameralism and presentment. Chadha also establishes
that bicameralism and presentment do not apply to agencies even when they do
the exact same thing as Congress might have done itself. This is because
agencies are executing the law as established by Congress through bicameralism
and presentment. 68 In addition to any substantive and procedural requirements
for agency action established by statute, there are three primary constitutional
structural provisions that apply to the EPA. First, unless the EPA claims it is
acting under a specific constitutional authorization, as the President does, for
example, when recognizing a foreign government, the EPA must be executing
the law, which means there must be a sufficiently specified delegation from
Congress. To meet the constitutional requirement, the delegation must contain
an “intelligible principle” directing the EPA’s actions. If there is no
constitutionally valid delegation from Congress, then the EPA would be acting
“ultra vires” in the same way that President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills
was unconstitutional in the absence of a statutory delegation of authority. 69
Second, the officials within the EPA exercising authority pursuant to law must
be appointed as Officers of the United States as specified by the Appointments
Clause. If the EPA officials are not appointed properly, they cannot exercise
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. Third, the officials must be
subject to some measure of presidential control through removal provisions that
68

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
This is the clear implication of the Court’s analysis in the Steel Seizure Case in which the
Court grappled with President Truman’s claim of inherent power to seize the steel mills in war
time to avert serious negative consequences to the war effort. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The Court’s decision appears to stand for the proposition
that the President had not only seized the mills, he had also seized the Congress’s legislative
power, and this he could not constitutionally do. In my view, it is more accurate to state that
President Truman’s action was illegal because it was ultra vires. In the Court’s view, President
Truman had no statutory or constitutional basis for seizing the mills. It’s not that the order to
seize the mills was an exercise of the legislative power. The President does not have legislative
power beyond the veto granted in Article I. It’s that lacking a constitutional basis, the only
possible source of presidential power would arise from a statute passed by Congress which was
also not present. In a sense, the nondelegation doctrine could be understood this way. Vague
statutes lacking an intelligible principle simply do not successfully delegate power to the
executive branch. On this understanding, the problem is not that such statutes improperly
delegate legislative power, it’s that they do not succesfully enable executive power because they
are not specific enough. Therefore, action taken purporting to rely on them is ultra vires
because it has not been successfully authorized.
69
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do not unduly hinder the President’s ability to supervise the execution of the
laws.
Similarly, Congress and the Executive Branch have overlapping power over the
status of aliens like Chadha. If Congress passes a law allowing the Department
of Justice or Homeland Security to naturalize or otherwise modify the status of
aliens, the exercise of authority under that law would be a classic case of
executing the law. However, when Congress passes a bill naturalizing a
particular alien or declaring that a particular alien should not be deported,
Congress has exercised its legislative power (and therefore must act pursuant to
bicameralism and presentment). 70 Further, if, in a justiciable case or
controversy, a federal court orders the Executive Branch to modify the status of
a particular alien, the court would have exercised the judicial power.
Although there are signs that the PCAOB decision could be the opening gambit
in a swing toward a stricter view of separation of powers, the Court did not
actually go very far in that direction. As noted above, the primary sign of this is
the invocation of the Vesting Clause of Article II as a basis for concluding that
the President must have some measure of control over all officials executing the
law. Although amicus suggested that the Court overrule Morrison v. Olson and
move toward a broader view of presidential power, 71 the Court noted that no
party had made this argument and declined to discuss overruling Morrison. The
Court reaffirmed Morrison’s understanding of the basic structure of
appointment and removal analysis, and it specifically approved for-cause
restrictions on the President’s power to remove independent agency heads and
delegation of removal power to officials other than the President.
While there may be small pockets in which conceptual analysis is relevant, such
as deciding on the essential attributes of Article III Courts that cannot be
exercised outside the judicial branch, these pockets are few and far between,
because in most cases it simply is not obvious where a power properly belongs.
Further, note that this is still a procedural matter, not a substantive limitation on
70

This sort of legislation many not be permissible in most states in the United States which have
bans on “special legislation” in their Constitutions. For example, Article IV, section 13 of the
Illinois Constitution provides: “The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a
general law is or can be made applicable.” Because the federal Constitution has no such
provision, Congress is free to legislate with greater particularity than most state legislatures,
subject to other limitations such as the prohibition on Bills of Attainder, which, under certain
circumstances, prevents Congress froms singling out individuals for unfavorable action. U.S.
Const. Art. I § 9, cl. 3.
71
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2009 WL 2372919
(Appellate Brief) (U.S. August 03, 2009), Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners
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what decisions can be made by a particular branch of government. The fact that
only a court has the power to issue a judgment does not tell us anything about
the content of the judgment or whether the very same legal standard could have
been made by an administrative agency, for example via rulemaking. The
substantive power of the federal courts overlaps with that of the other branches.
For example, consider a controversy over whether a particular collective
bargaining strategy constitutes an unfair labor practice under the National Labor
Relations Act. All three branches have the power to make a decision on the
subject. The National Labor Relations Board, as part of the Executive Branch,
can determine that the conduct is an unfair labor practice. On judicial review, a
federal court can make the very same determination. And Congress has the
power to legislatively specify whether the practice is unlawful. Each branch is
performing its assigned constitutional function and must observe the
constitutional requirements for actions that apply to it. 72
For another simple example, a majority in one House of Congress can prevent a
bill from becoming law by voting it down, the President can prevent a bill from
taking effect by vetoing it and the judiciary can prevent a statute from having
legal effect by declaring it unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. Of
course, there are structural limits on the power of each branch. For example, if
a bill was passed in a prior Congress, bicameralism and presentment would be
72

To understand how powers overlap, consider the Commander-in-Chief power. Perhaps it is in
the nature of the power to direct the military that it belongs to the President, but this is a very
unsettled area of constitutional law. The Constitution (Article I, § 8) explicitly grants Congress
several powers over the military, including the power “to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces” and the power to declare war. Further, the
appointment of military commanders is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Thus,
even what appears to be the quintessential executive function is subject to legislative checking
and involvement. Over the years, some of the most extravagant claims for exclusive
presidential power have involved this power. Consider, for example, Robert Bork’s view that
Congress lacked the power to legislatively prevent President Nixon from ordering attacks on
Cambodian territory during the war in Vietnam. In Bork’s view, congressional efforts to
prevent attacks on Cambodia interfered with the President’s power as Commander–in-Chief. As
Bork stated in 1971:
I arrive, therefore, at the conclusion that President Nixon had full Constitutional power
to order the Cambodian incursion, and that Congress cannot, with Constitutional
propriety, undertake to control the details of that incursion. This conclusion in no way
detracts from Congress's war powers, for that body retains control of the issue of war or
peace. It can end our armed involvement in Southeast Asia and it can forbid entry into
new wars to defend governments there. But it ought not try to exercise Executive
discretion in the carrying out of a general policy it approves.
Symposium on United States Action in Cambodia, 1970, in the Light of International and
Constitutional Law; Comments of Robert Bork, 65 Am. J. Int'l L. 77, 81 (1971). For a contrary
view, built a history of congressional micromanagement of the conduct of wars during the early
years of the nation, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War
and Military Powers, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 299 (2008).
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required to repeal it even for constitutional reasons. The President cannot
exercise a “veto” over a law that is already in effect, 73 and the judiciary may act
only if presented with a justiciable controversy that implicates the
constitutionality of the law.
C. The Importance of the Identity of the Actor
Now that it has been established that more than one branch can take the exact
same substantive action without violating separation of powers, we can move on
to proposition 6.
6. Building on proposition 5, the identity of the actor performing the
action and not the nature of the action itself usually determines what sort
of action is being performed. For example, when Congress acts, it is
legislating and when an administrative agency acts it is executing the law,
even if the action taken is, in substance, identical.
In the American Trucking nondelegation decision, Justices Scalia and Stevens
sparred over whether it is more accurate to state that Congress may not delegate
any legislative power or to state that the nondelegation doctrine allows Congress
to delegate a limited amount of legislative power. In response to Justice
Scalia’s point that no delegation of legislative power is allowed, Justice Stevens
argued that when the EPA establishes NAAQS’s, it exercises delegated
legislative power and Justice Scalia is incorrect to deny this point. Justice
Stevens expanded on this argument by claiming that the nature of the
government action and not the identity of the actor determines what action is
being performed.
Justice Stevens’s view that some delegation of legislative power is permissible
is inconsistent with the Court’s general practice in separation of powers cases,
under which decisions often turn on the identity of the actor rather than the
action taken. The procedural understandings of legislating and executing the
law provide the basis for this conclusion. Continuing with the example of
establishing NAAQS’s, when the EPA acted, it was executing the law, namely
the Clean Air Act, 74 which instructed the EPA to establish NAAQS’s. The
EPA’s actions meet the definition of actions that can be taken only by Officers
of the United States, namely the exercise of significant authority pursuant to the
73

There is substantial controversy over whether the President may refuse to enforce a law that in
his or her opinion is unconstitutional. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty
To Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L. J. 1613 (2008); Peter L. Strauss, The President
and Choices Not To Enforce, Law & Contemp Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 107.
74
42 U.S.C. § 7409.
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law. If Congress has not delegated power to the EPA to establish NAAQS’s,
then chances are any effort by EPA to do so would be illegal not because of the
nondelegation doctrine but because the EPA would be acting without legal
authority, i.e. ultra vires. If Congress were to promulgate NAAQS’s on its own
using bicameralism and presentment, it would meet the definition of
legislation—it would affect the rights and duties of people outside Congress.
Thus, the same substantive action is execution when done by an agency and
legislation when done by Congress.
Although it presents a somewhat more difficult case, even adjudication is
subject to this analysis. When the judiciary establishes a binding legal rule in
the course of resolving a case or controversy, it is adjudicating, not legislating.
If the legislature is dissatisfied with a non-constitutional judicial decision, it can
override the decision by legislating. An agency can promulgate regulations in
reaction to an unfavorable judicial decision, and, under certain circumstances,
can force a court to abandon what it considers the best interpretation of a federal
statute in favor of a different, but reasonable agency interpretation. 75 Even
when a non-Article III judge presides over what looks like an adjudicatory
procedure, that official is engaged in the execution of the law unless the nonArticle III tribunal purports to have the power to employ the essential attributes
of the judicial power.
When a non-Article III decisionmaker employs an adjudicatory process to
resolve a claim against the government, that decisionmaker is executing the law
creating the claim or waiving sovereign immunity as to a claim created
elsewhere. The fact that an adjudicatory process is used does not mean that the
decisionmaker is exercising the judicial power of the United States. These are
the sort of claims that could be resolved in a non-adjudicatory process, and the
fact that Congress or an agency decides to use an adjudicatory procedure does
not mean that judicial power is involved, just as rulemaking is execution, not
legislation. Due process may require an adjudicatory procedure in some cases,
but it does not require an Article III decisionmaker.
The separation of powers issues regarding adjudication are more complicated
because the Court has liberalized the use of non-Article III decisionmakers to
include private rights that would have traditionally been resolved (in the federal
system) by Article III judges. It can be argued that when a federal agency
resolves, for example, a state law breach of contract claim between a
75

National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S.
967, 982-83 (2005).
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commodities broker and a customer, 76 the agency is exercising the judicial
power of the United States. More than in any other area, including agency
rulemaking under delegation from Congress, agency adjudication of private
rights appears to involve the exercise of judicial power outside of the Article III
courts.
Despite the apparent assumption of Article III powers by non-Article III
tribunes, in allowing agency adjudication of private rights, the Court has applied
a forgiving standard similar to the standard that governs separation of powers
disputes when no particular structural or procedural provision has been violated.
Because the Constitution does not enumerate the structural aspects of the
judicial power, the Court’s standard for evaluating the permissibility of nonArticle III adjudication is not very specific, examining “the practical effect that
the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the
federal judiciary” to ensure that agency adjudicatory power does not
“impermissibly threaten[] the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”77
Under this standard, the Court looks at a range of factors including “the extent
to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III
courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises
the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts,
the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.” 78 Applying this
standard, the Court would deny agencies the power to issue final judgments or
punish contempt, has favored non-deferential judicial review of agency
decisions, required a realistic option of Article III adjudication and has allowed
non-Article III adjudication of private rights claims only when they are closely
related to federal regulation. 79
V. The Assignment of Powers
A. General Principles
7. The strongest evidence that a power is assigned to a particular branch is
an explicit textual commitment of that action to branch, not because of a
more general principle of separation of powers. When a power has been
assigned to a particular branch, no other branch is allowed to exercise that
function unless the Constitution explicitly permits it to.
76

As considered by the Supreme Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
77
See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
78
Id.
79
See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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This proposition is very similar to proposition 4 but with stress on the
commitments the Constitution’s text makes of particular powers to specific
branches. The substantive powers of the federal government are shared among
the branches. The powers each branch has over substantive areas of the law are
overlapping, provided that each branch employs the procedural and structural
requirements that apply to it. Some matters in which the Constitution may
assign powers to a particular branch are not textually specified. For example,
only a Court of Law can issue a binding final judgment in a matter within the
judicial power of the United States and only an Article III Court can preside
over a jury trial. The Supreme Court has characterized these as the essential
attributes of the judicial power that are exclusively held by the federal courts.
This last observation tests a primary proposition on which this essay is based,
that separation of powers disputes are not resolved by inquiring into the nature
of the power being exercised and then assigning the power to a branch. The
reason for this is that the procedural and structural incidents of the judicial
power are under-specified as compared with those that apply to the other
branches. The Vesting Clause of Article III may be more important than the
other Vesting Clauses in that it is relied upon to assign certain fundamental
judicial attributes to the federal courts. In most cases, however, assignment of a
power to a particular branch is based on a specific textual provision and not on
general principles of separation of powers.
Even the substantive aspect of the judicial power is subject to similar sharing
given that Congress can change the law and determine the outcome of legal
controversies or render them moot. Consider what happened to litigation over
the effects of logging on the species of bird known as the “spotted owl.” After
environmentalists and logging interests challenged the federal government’s
logging plans in court, Congress passed a statute essentially approving the
government’s plan. The statute even mentioned the litigation by case name and
number. This was challenged as an infringement on the judicial function and
the Supreme Court unanimously upheld Congress’s action, proclaiming that
Congress had changed the law and had not trampled on the judiciary’s power to
resolve cases. 80 Had Congress not acted, the federal courts might have made
the very same substantive decision, that the logging plans were consistent with
the law, or it might have decided differently. As a matter of substance, all three
branches had the power to make the exact same decision over the protection of
the spotted owl from the effects of logging.

80

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
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In addition to the practical difficulty of assigning powers to branches, there are
positive constitutional reasons for not resolving separation of powers disputes
by determining which branch is the one to properly exercise a particular power.
A conceptual analysis would weaken the checks and balances aspect of
separation of powers law. As the Framers made clear, the idea of separation of
powers is not to assign a power to each branch and then give that branch a free
hand in exercising that power. Rather, they understood that the whole idea of
separation of powers is to condition government action on agreement among
multiple centers of power. For this to work, each branch must have a way to
check the others. One way that this checking occurs is through the uncertainty
of the assignment of powers. When more than one branch has a colorable claim
of authority in a substantive area, competition for control can occur. This is the
essence of separation of powers with checks and balances.
B. Textual Commitment
There are functions that can be performed by only one branch of government,
usually because the text of the Constitution specifically assigns the function to a
particular branch. For example, the President’s exclusive control over the
recognition of foreign governments is based on the textual commitment of the
power to receive foreign ambassadors to the President in Article II, § 3 of the
Constitution.81 Similarly, because of textual commitment, only the House of
Representatives can vote articles of impeachment and only the Senate can
conduct trials in cases of impeachment. Only the President can nominate and
appoint principal Officers of the United States. Only the two Houses of
Congress can pass bills and present them to the President and only the President
can sign or veto bills presented.
When a power has been assigned to a particular branch, other branches are not
allowed to participate in the exercise of the power unless an additional
constitutional provision allows it. Note that this element of proposition 7 does
not depend on a substantive theory of the nature of the powers that belong to
each branch. Rather, assignment is normally due to a specific textual provision
rather than based on general separation of powers principles. Exclusivity is
implied from a positive grant of power. For example, the specification of the
process for making law, i.e. bicameralism and presentment, strongly implies
that only Congress has the power to perform that function. The Appointments
Clause vests the power to nominate and appoint officials in the President except
that with regard to inferior officers, Congress may legislate to allow Department
81

See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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Heads and Courts of Law to make appointments. Participation by any others,
such as Members of Congress, in the appointment of officials is unconstitutional
except when specifically authorized by the Constitution. The Senate would not
be allowed to participate in the appointment of Officers of the United States
were it not for the particular constitutional provision requiring the advice and
consent of the Senate for such appointments, and the President would not be
allowed to participate in the legislative process absent the presentment
requirement spelled out in Article II. This explains why the House is not
allowed to participate at all in the appointments process.
It might appear that this analysis depends on a conceptual understanding of
separation of powers in the following sense. How do we know that the Senate
could not participate in the appointment of Officers of the United States without
the specific reference in the Appointments Clause to the Senate’s power of
advice and consent? Is this because appointment is, by nature, an executive
function, just as passing legislation is a legislative function in which the
President would not be allowed to participate without the specific constitutional
authorization of the veto? There is some truth to this challenge to my approach,
but I do not think it refutes the approach in most cases. For example, even if the
Appointments Clause did not exist, efforts by Congress to appoint executive
branch officials might be unconstitutional under the general separation of
powers standard not because appointment is an executive function but because
it would prevent the President from accomplishing the constitutional functions
of the presidency. In fact, as noted above, the Supreme Court has recognized
that because the Appointments Clause invests the Courts of Law with the
potential power to appoint inferior officers, the power to appoint Officers of the
United States is not exclusively an executive power. 82 The President’s power to
veto legislation would be more difficult to justify without a specific
constitutional authorization, but, as the Framers recognized, the absence of the
veto would threaten the presidency. 83
There is one area of significant uncertainty regarding this proposition, namely
restrictions on appointments such as bipartisanship requirements, qualifications
and other limitations on the President’s power to choose freely who to nominate
and appoint. For those who rely on the Vesting Clauses to create a substantive
form of separation of powers, this issue is easy—Congress should not be able to
82

Morisson v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 695.
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-48 (discussing two bases for veto, the President’s need to
protect the presidency from legislative encroachment and the necessity of limiting Congress’s
propensity to pass ill-considered, faction-dominated legislation.)
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restrict the President’s choice in appointments matters. 84 To them, only
rejection by the Senate should limit the President’s choice of who to appoint as
an Officer of the United States. 85
Whether Congress has power to limit the President’s choice of who to appoint
has not been resolved in court. Perhaps this is unlikely to arise in a justiciable
form because the President, in order to receive continued cooperation from
Congress, will observe the limitations even if he or she believes they are
unconstitutional. 86 To those who rely on the Vesting Clauses of the
Constitution to create a strong form of separation of powers, these restrictions
may appear unconstitutional as an interference with the President’s appointment
power. They can point out that the contrary view implies that Congress may
restrict, for example, the President’s use of the Pardon Power, perhaps by
substantively restricting it or by requiring certain procedures before a pardon
may be issued. If the President’s pardon power must remain unrestricted, it is
plausible to argue that legal restrictions on the President’s choice of nominees
are unconstitutional.
This is one of those areas that the text of the Constitution does not definitively
resolve. Because of the lack of direct textual resolution, congressional
prescription of professional and political qualifications for presidential
appointees is likely to be evaluated under the general separation of powers
standard of whether the qualifications unduly hamper the President’s ability to
perform his constitutional functions, mainly to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed. As in the vast majority of other situations in which this
standard applies, the answer is likely to be no.
The discussion of these seven propositions forms the core of the understanding
of separation of powers offered in this essay. In what follows, I discuss two
84

For an argument that all statutory qualifications for federal offices requiring Senate
confirmation are unconstitutional, see Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses:
Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 745 (2008).
85
For example, after the Katrina disaster, when the federal government’s response was marred
by FEMA’s apparent indifference and incompetence, Congress prescribed strict professional
qualifications for the FEMA directorship. President George W. Bush objected to these in a
signing statement on the ground that they would prevent him from appointing many qualified
people of his choice, and promised to “construe [the statute] in a manner consistent with the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.” Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2007, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1742 (Oct. 4, 2006).
86
If the President violates a statutory restriction and, with cooperation from the Senate, made an
appointment contrary to a statutory restriction, perhaps a party subject to regulation by the
official involved would be able to argue that regulation is unlawful because the officials were
not appointed in accordance with governing law. As far as I know, this has never happened.
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minor propositions that are somewhat peripheral to the theory but still important
enough to be worthy of mention.
VI. Some Minor Corollaries of the General Understanding.
A. Informal Pressure
8. Informal pressure on the holder of a power to exercise it in a particular
way does not violate separation of powers.
When the Constitution assigns a function to a particular official or branch of
government, only that official may perform the function. However, separation
of powers does not prohibit officials in other branches from using their
governmental power to exert informal influence over the carrying out of the
function. For example, as we know, the President has the constitutional power
to appoint Officers of the United States and federal judges, and only the Senate
has the advice and consent power. A Member of the House of Representatives
may insist that the President appoint his chosen candidate, and might use power
over the President’s legislative agenda “convince” the President to comply. A
cursory look at the resumes of presidential appointees to agencies would reveal
that many were congressional staff members before their appointments. There
is also a longstanding tradition of Presidents allowing Senators to virtually
choose federal judicial nominees who will sit in their states. As long as the
President actually exercises the power to nominate and appoint, external
informal involvement in the decisionmaking process presents no separation of
powers problem. 87
There are lesser known manifestations of external influence on the execution of
the law. In the appropriations area, congressional committees exert a great deal
of influence over how agencies spend funds when they have discretion under
appropriations statutes. For example, with regard to military spending, the
armed services have at times treated committee reports as if they contain
binding legal instructions on how to spend funds. 88 Congressional committees
expect agencies to consult them before spending funds differently from what
they were requested for. 89 Agencies and the President comply with these
87

For a general look at this, see Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San
Diego L. Rev. 61 (2006).
88
John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional: Radical Textualism,
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 489, 563-65 (2001).
89
The Supreme Court has made it clear that funding requirements contained only in
congressional committee reports are not legally binding. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v.
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practices because they need continued cooperation from Members of Congress
and congressional committees. Members of Congress also sit in on trade
negotiations and accompany Executive Branch officials on trade missions.
Again, as long as the actual exercise of executive power is performed only by
Officers of the United States, the fact that it is done under pressure from
Members of Congress has no constitutional significance.
As one court has stated in a case in which a criminal defendant challenged his
conviction on the basis that a Member of Congress had informally asked the
Department of Justice to investigate:
Legislators routinely express their opinions to executive branch officials
about matters for which their departments or agencies are responsible. . . .
Defendant's position presumes that executive officials must disregard
these views and remain entirely free of their influence in order to maintain
the separation of powers, but this is impracticable, unnecessary, and bears
no relation to the actual workings of the modern administrative state. . . .
Furthermore, the adoption of Defendant's conception of the separation of
powers would surely hinder legitimate congressional oversight of
executive agencies. . . . This interaction among the branches is simply part
of the vigorous engagement that gives rise to the system of checks and
balances in our government. 90
While due process and the Administrative Procedure Act require insulation of
decisionmakers from informal pressure in adjudicatory proceedings, it is
difficult to imagine a separation of powers violation resulting from informal
pressure on executive officials.
B. Under-enforcement

__________________________________________________________________
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 646 (2005); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993). Late in his
presidency, George W. Bush instructed agencies not to treat as binding spending instructions
contained in committee reports. See Executive Order 13457, 73 Fed. Reg. 6417 (Feb. 1, 2008).
This Executive Order may be viewed as an example of improper midnight activity, since
President Bush waited until the last year of his second term to issue an order that regulated
internal executive branch activity. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in
Transitions, 83 B.U.L. Rev. 947 (2003). Further, Congress continues to include unconstitutional
legislative vetoes in appropriations legislation. It is unclear whether agencies informally
comply with the veto provisions.
90
United States v. Mardis, 670 F. Supp.2d 696, 702-03 (W.D. Tenn., 2009).
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9. Separation of powers norms may be underenforced judicially. In other
words, the constitutional ideal may involve a stricter understanding of
separation of powers than what the federal courts are willing to enforce.
Scholars have long distinguished between actual legal norms and judicial
enforcement of the norms. 91 The theory is that full judicial enforcement of
some legal norms, such as separation of powers, may be unrealistic or even
undesirable. To a legal realist this may seem paradoxical or even plain wrong.
How can there be an unenforced legal norm? Without enforcement, realism
teaches that there is no such legal norm. The answer to this objection involves
Norms of judicial restraint and
taking an institutional perspective. 92
competence may lead judges to uphold laws that they might believe are
inconsistent with the best view of what the Constitution requires. A judge
might vote to uphold a law that she would have opposed on constitutional
grounds as a legislator or President, would oppose on constitutional grounds.
Courts might systematically under-enforce separation of powers norms for a
variety of reasons. The simplest reason is the difficulty of matching function to
branch. The nondelegation doctrine provides the clearest example of this. The
execution of the law virtually always involves discretion on the part of
Executive Branch officials, and it would be very difficult to construct a legal
standard to capture the norm against delegation of legislative power. Perhaps
this is why Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Whitman stated that the
courts have not felt “qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law.” 93
Further, separation of powers controversies often arise in the most politically
sensitive and contentious areas, when Congress feels the need to break from
tradition. The Independent Counsel provisions upheld in Morrison provide a
good example of this. The Watergate scandal spawned several innovations that
Congress apparently thought were necessary to restore the public’s faith in
government. Whether it is fear of a backlash or genuine concern that Courts
should not meddle in politically sensitive areas unless absolutely necessary, it is
not surprising that judges might be restrained when asked to invalidate
important legislation for violating a general separation of powers norm.
91

Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
92
See id.
93
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001).
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Under-enforcement of separation of powers norms is most likely to exist in
areas without clear constitutional rules such as an explicit procedural or
structural provision. It might be truer to the Constitution, under whatever
theory of constitutional interpretation one holds, to be much stricter with regard
to delegation of discretion to the executive branch, restrictions on appointment
and removal of Officers of the United States and adjudication outside Article III
courts. Perhaps it would be truer to the Constitution to prohibit agency
rulemaking, agency adjudication and congressional specification of
qualifications for executive office. But except to those with excessive
confidence in their ability to extrapolate clear understandings from vagaries of
the Vesting Clauses or non-specific constitutional provisions, these are all areas
in which there is no clear answer in the text of the Constitution.
This understanding is consistent with the way separation of powers law has
developed. The Court strictly enforces most of the particular procedural and
structural separation of powers provisions of the Constitution but is very lenient
when the case boils down to whether there has been a violation of general
separation of powers norms. A court concerned with restraint is likely, absent
compelling circumstances, to feel more comfortable enforcing the specific
requirements of the Appointments Clause and bicameralism and presentment
than with invalidating legislation based on a vague undefined separation of
powers understanding. It may be that a “true” understanding of separation of
powers would invalidate independent agencies and all restrictions on the
President’s power to appoint and remove Officers of the United States. It may
even be that a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court hold such views,
but are unwilling to act on them for reasons of judicial restraint. The PCAOB
decision may be a nudge in the direction of less discomfort with employing
general separation of powers norms, but it remains to be seen whether the Court
will move the law toward greater enforcement of general separation of powers
norms.
VII. Conclusion
Although the Court’s recent decision invalidating the provisions governing
removal of members of the PCAOB contains hints of a movement toward strict
application of separation of powers norms, at the end of the day, the Court
preserved the basic structure of separation of powers under which courts strictly
enforce the particular procedural and structural provisions of the Constitution
and are lenient when only the general notion of separation of powers is
implicated. Key to this understanding is that the Vesting Clauses of the first
three Articles of the Constitution are not among the strictly enforced provisions
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of the Constitution. Under separation of powers in the United States
government, the branches have overlapping power in many substantive areas,
ensuring a robust system of checks and balances. Separation of powers law
looks very little at the substance of government action, demanding usually only
that each branch follow the procedural and structural requirements that apply to
it. Except in areas clearly governed by a particular procedural or structural
constitutional provision, the law of separation of powers allows for a great deal
of flexibility concerning the structure and operation of the federal government.
The powers of the three branches of the United States government are
overlapping, with the fundamental understanding the each branch of
government must honor the Constitution’s procedural and structural provisions.
While conceptual analysis of the nature of government power and assignment of
each power to a particular branch may be theoretically satisfying, it does not
representing the theory or practice of separation of powers in the United States.
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